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We provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. Using US data for 1950-90 we
document, contrary to widespread assumptions, substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both
across states and over time. Gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and
taxes, after controlling for state and time fixed effects. The economic effects seem large: governors
receive a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4.5 percent
increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in their states. There is strong
evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of "reward-for-performance". The evidence on the
income elasticity of pay is less conclusive, but is suggestive of "rent extraction" motives. Lastly, we
find that democratic institutions seem to play an important role in shaping pay. For example, voter-
initiatives and the presence of significant political opposition lead to large reductions in the income
elasticity of pay, and to large increases (at least double) in the tax elasticities of pay, relative to the
elasticities that are observed when these democratic institutions are weaker.
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  In 2000, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore gave himself a pay 
increase of 14 percent, raising his already high salary to US$1.1 million.  This prompted 
some uncharacteristic murmurs of protest among Singaporeans regarding their leaders’ 
pay.  Nonetheless, Prime Minister Goh received his raise, and encouraged Singaporeans 
to judge his government on its record for promoting economic competitiveness and its 
effectiveness in setting government policy (Webb, 2000).  Thus, he was effectively 
claiming that he deserved increased pay in reward for strong past performance.   
Singapore, however, is not a democracy, so its citizens had little recourse to prevent the 
pay increase from taking place.  Hence, in this case, it is unclear whether this is an 
example of rent extraction by a leader insulated from democratic pressures, or reward for 
good performance.  More generally, the question arises, are politicians paid for strong 
performance, or do they extract whatever salary and benefits are permitted by their 
circumstances. In this paper, we take advantage of variation in economic performance 
and democratic institutions across states and over time in the United States to address this 
important question in more general terms. 
A traditional starting point in analyzing politicians’ behaviors is that they are 
socially motivated. That is, in contrast to private sector managers, politicians are altruistic 
and do not care about monetary income. In this naïve view, one can ignore politician pay, 
as it is irrelevant: as long as politicians are able to subsist at a reasonable level, pay 
should not affect their actions.  However, over the past few decades, economists and 
political scientists have considered more realistic formal models of political economy that 
incorporate considerations such as those described in the opening paragraph. In these 
models, politicians no longer set out exclusively to maximize social welfare, but instead 
seek to also increase their chances of re-election, try to expand the sizes of the 
organizations they manage, and even accept bribes. However, once politicians have some 
pecuniary motivation, a natural starting point in trying to understand their conduct is to 
study politician pay. The primary purpose of this paper is to take a first step in analyzing 
the officially sanctioned financial compensation of politicians. 
Economists often assume that non-private sector workers face flat pay schedules   3
and low powered incentive schemes. A case in point is bureaucratic compensation.
1  Two 
explanations have been proposed, one based on the implication of multiple objectives of 
government bureaucracies and the other based on the idea that only informal incentives, 
i.e., career concerns, matter (see, for example, Tirole (1994)). Although we know of no 
fully-fledged model of politician pay, a reasonable first approach to these issues suggests 
that, as in theories of pay in bureaucracies, monetary payments would play a minor role 
and that we should expect to see little variation in the remuneration of politicians.
2 Yet, in 
any particular year, there are large cross-state differences in the pay of political leaders in 
the United States. For example, in 1996, the most recent year for which we have data, the 
governor of the state of New York earned $130,000, while the governor of Montana 
earned about $55,000, and cross-sectional dispersion only increases as we look back in 
time. Furthermore, there are also large differences in gubernatorial pay, in real terms, 
over time. Average pay for governors (in 1982 dollars) increased from $48,090 in 1950 to 
$80,037 in 1968; by 1994 it was down to $58,738. Thus, contrary to popular belief, there 
is considerable variation in political compensation, both over time and across states.  One 
of the contributions of the paper is to document these basic patterns that are present in the 
data. 
We go on to analyze the relationship between the governor's wage and measures 
of state performance, using data for 48 states over the period 1950-90. Reports in the 
media suggest that politicians’ pay is heavily influenced by economic conditions. For 
example, in the late 1980s, with the American economy in a recession, newspaper 
accounts described considerable opposition to politicians’ attempts to increase their own 
wages. Thus, when Texas lawmakers announced their intentions to vote a wage increase 
in 1989, the Houston Chronicle responded with an editorial arguing that, “[w]hen the 
state's economy is still struggling and thousands of Texans are unemployed, lawmakers 
shouldn't expect much public sympathy over how little they are paid". 
3 We examine this 
possibility empirically, following the approach developed in the executive compensation 
literature and applying it to politician pay.  We find that, after controlling for state and 
                                                 
1 The title of a recent paper on executive compensation is "Are CEO's really paid like Bureaucrats?”  (Hall 
and Liebman, 1998). This paper takes as given that bureaucrats have low-powered incentives. 
2 The arguments presented in Tirole (1994), for example, justify this statement.  
3 Similar stories were reported in California during this period.   4
year fixed effects, there is a strong and robust positive association between gubernatorial 
pay and state per capita income. The elasticity is large, in excess of 0.4. 
An alternative performance metric is state taxes. Peltzman (1992) presents theory 
and evidence consistent with the idea that taxes are set at a level that is higher than the 
level preferred by the median voter.  Peltzman’s theory of voters as fiscal conservatives 
also finds empirical support in the work of Matsusaka (1995), who shows that states that 
allow voter initiatives have lower taxes than “pure representation” states. This suggests 
that taxes may be used as a second measure of performance. There is ample anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that fiscal dynamics affect gubernatorial pay. For example, when 
California announced that its legislators and senior elected officials would receive pay 
increases in 1990, the Los Angeles Times published an article reporting that “[t]he action 
was expected to generate political fallout, coming in the wake of reports that the state is 
facing an estimated $5 billion-plus budget shortfall in the current and coming fiscal 
years. The commission Friday sat through several hours of mostly hostile testimony from 
the public objecting to the increases”.
4 Our empirical results are consistent with this idea: 
there is a strong and robust negative effect of taxes on the pay of state political leaders. 
Governors suffer a one percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in taxes per capita, 
or equivalently, a one standard deviation increase in per capita tax payments brings about 
a decline of ten percent of a standard deviation in gubernatorial pay. Thus, governors get 
a similar pay increase if the income per capita of their voters increases by 1 percent or if 
they reduce per capita tax payments by approximately 4 percent. 
  Three alternative theories can explain the positive relationship between wages and 
income. First, we consider the simple possibility that voters increase gubernatorial pay 
when income increases in order to keep the governor's position constant in the state’s 
distribution of income. A second hypothesis is that the public implicitly provides rewards 
for politicians to induce high effort in the design and implementation of good policies, 
just like in a principal agent model. Since good policies are more likely to have been 
chosen when performance is good, the public rewards the governor with higher wages 
                                                 
4 Similarly, in Virginia in 1981, the Washington Post reported that the Virginia Senate was nearly 
successful in blocking a moderate wage increase for that state’s governor, on the grounds that, “the pay 
raise would be unwise when the assembly already has voted down tax relief measures for the people.” 
By far the most common element to newspaper reports complaining about governors’ wage increases is that 
such increases are inappropriate at times when the state is struggling with a fiscal crisis.   5
when they experience higher incomes. This can be called "reward-for-performance". 
Finally, an alternative theory maintains that politicians are rent-seekers. In good times 
they take as much in wages as they can, constrained by the public's patience and the 
cultural stigma attached to greedy public servants. This may be called "rent-extraction". 
In contrast, the negative tax elasticity of pay can only reflect “reward for performance” 
motives. 
  Further insight into the properties of the income elasticity of pay can be gained by 
examining the impact of forces that are beyond the governor's discretion that affect state 
income. Optimal incentive schemes should not incorporate such measures into 
compensation: they increase noise (for which the agent must be compensated) and do not 
improve effort. The most obvious example is shocks to income originating in observable 
movements in aggregate income. The evidence we present suggests that governors 
receive higher wages as a result of increases in income that originate in the aggregate 
economy, so we can reject “reward-for-performance” motives behind the income 
elasticity of gubernatorial pay. 
In contrast, and supporting the view that the tax elasticity of pay is influenced by 
reward-based considerations, we find evidence that forces beyond the governor’s control 
that affect the revenue-raising requirements of the state government have no effect on 
gubernatorial pay. Furthermore, the strong correlation between taxes and gubernatorial 
wages derives primarily from wage increases of governors that have been in office for 
more than a year. Collectively, this evidence suggests that voters (and legislatures) may, 
in fact, be rewarding governors for fiscal discipline (or, symmetrically, punishing 
governors for fiscal irresponsibility).  
In a firm, managers’ wages are set, at least in theory, by the shareholders of the 
firm. Analogously, voters may be seen as ultimately setting the wages of politicians, and 
may have some scope to do so through various political institutions. Accordingly, we 
investigate whether "democracy" plays a role in controlling the rent-extraction activities 
of politicians. Theoretically, the literature considers three different methods of controlling 
politicians: elections, separation of powers and "direct" democracy. On the use of 
elections, Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), amongst others, have made the point that 
accountability will be lower for politicians that do not expect to run again for office. On   6
the separation of powers, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), amongst others, argued 
that opposing branches of government work by creating a conflict of interests between 
the executive and the legislature, thereby disciplining rent-seeking behavior by either 
party. Finally, on the role of "direct democracy", Frey (1994) and Matsusaka (1992, 
1995) argue that institutions that allow for direct influence of voters within electoral 
periods introduce accountability.  
We examine each of the preceding three hypotheses empirically. First, similar to 
Besley and Case (1995), we exploit variations in gubernatorial term limits and re-election 
opportunities to provide some general evidence on the hypothesis that elections promote 
government accountability. Second, we study the hypothesis that the separation of 
powers makes governors more accountable by examining how opposition in the state 
Senate affects the determination of gubernatorial pay. Finally, we examine the hypothesis 
that gubernatorial pay is more closely tied to performance where citizens may directly 
control politicians, by looking at the properties of gubernatorial pay in voter initiative 
states, where voters do not have to rely on either of the mechanisms described above to 
control politicians.
5 The data are strongly supportive of the latter two hypotheses while 
they are inconclusive with regard to the first.  One potential interpretation of these results 
is that citizens’ initiatives and split government are more effective means of controlling 
politicians than re-election incentives.
6   
The results on democracy also help us rule out the hypothesis that the income 
elasticity can be explained by a desire to keep the governor at a constant position in the 
state income distribution. Under this hypothesis we would expect the positive income 
elasticity of pay to be stronger, not weaker, in states where democracy is working well to 
achieve desired policy outcomes, i.e., in states with voter initiatives and/or a strong 
opposition. Our results do not support this view. 
To our knowledge, there is no previous published work on the empirical 
                                                 
5 These results are of relevance that is completely independent of the question of gubernatorial pay.  If one 
accepts the baseline results on the relationship between taxation, income, and gubernatorial pay, one can 
use the results to evaluate the effectiveness of various democratic institutions in controlling pay, with the 
hope that they reflect the effectiveness of these institutions in controlling other areas of gubernatorial 
discretion that are less readily observable. 
6 One potential concern with this conclusion may be that governors late in their terms have little incentive 
to push up their salaries, since they will only receive it for a very limited period.  But most governors’ 
pension benefits are tied to their salaries during their last year in office, so this is unlikely to be important.   7
determinants of a politician's legal monetary income. There is a considerable body of 
research looking at a related margin: the impact of economic variables on the election 
probabilities of incumbent political leaders. An important literature has looked at the 
impact of economic events on political popularity, based both on actual votes and on 
popularity functions (see Fair (1978), Frey and Schneider (1978a), Alesina, Roubini, and 
Cohen (1997), Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel (1995), inter alia). In Frey (1978b) it is 
explicitly argued that politicians may "consume" the pursuit of partisan objectives when 
they have a comfortable lead in popularity, i.e. when there are electoral rents. Closer to 
our paper is Besley and Case (1996), which examines the effect of state economic 
performance (relative to neighboring states) on the re-election probabilities of US 
governors. They find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that voters take into account 
information from neighboring states in what can be called a nexus of yardstick 
competition. In a related contribution, Wolfers (2002) looks at the electoral performance 
of governors and finds that they are rewarded for luck, in the sense that exogenous 
positive shocks to state income increase the likelihood of re-election. More generally, we 
share with Besley and Case (1996) and Wolfers (2002) an interest in studying data 
generated in political markets using the techniques and ideas of the recent executive 
compensation literature.  Finally, our work also ties into the literature on executive 
compensation (e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990)). This literature has similarly tried to 
distinguish between rent-seeking and pay-for-performance (i.e., reward-based pay) for 
corporate executives.  
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section I outlines a simple model to 
capture the intuition described in our introduction. Section II describes the paper's 
empirical strategy, while section III describes the data and its sources. Section IV 
presents our empirical results and section V concludes. 
 
I. Gubernatorial Pay: Background and Model 
 
Ia. Institutional Background 
Until recently, governors' salaries were determined almost exclusively by legislative 
statute, thereby requiring approval of the legislature (See Book of the States, various   8
years, for further details). Increases were generally not automatically adjusted for 
inflation, so that any salary increase required the consideration of state's legislative 
bodies. Several states have recently shifted to salary-setting by independent salary 
commissions, but only after our sample period ended.  Moreover, the effect of this shift is 
unclear: while it was intended to create bodies that would objectively evaluate the 
governor's pay, this has not always been the case. For example, in California, where the 
governor's salary is now set by an ‘independent’ commission, the governor appoints all 
members of the salary commission. Recently, this has brought about concerns about the 
true independence of the commission, and has led to calls for a return to salary setting by 
legislative statute. 
  There is one notable exception to salary-setting by legislative statute that is 
particularly important for our paper: on a number of occasions, citizens' initiatives have 
been used to directly control the salaries of legislators. For example, a 1966 voter 
initiative in California set a limit on the salary increases that public officials could 
approve for themselves.  In Oregon, a 1962 initiative gave legislators the power to 
increase their own salaries, while a very recent initiative in that state has been put 
forward to repeal the 1962 amendment (Law, 2001).
7  Note, however, that citizens' 
initiatives need not directly impact salaries to act as a restraining force: to the extent that 
it gives voters greater bargaining power vis a vis politicians, it may indirectly affect the 
outcome of the salary bargaining game. 
 
I.b. Theoretical Background 
According to the previous section, while a state’s citizens could not directly control the 
governor through the setting of his salary during the period under consideration, they 
were able to do so indirectly through their control over the legislature.  We may therefore 
model the setting of the governor's salary as the outcome of two factors: the governor's 
                                                 
7 A case played itself out in Massachusetts recently that is of particular interest for our paper.  In 1995, 
voters petitioned to have included on the ballot an initiative that would have reduced legislative salaries, 
but the Massachusetts Supreme Court disallowed the initiative.  Political activists several years later tried to 
resurrect the movement, prompting an opinion piece in the Boston Herald, suggesting that the activists 
concentrate on getting the state legislature to pass a tax reduction bill (Anderson, 1999); this is explicitly 
the type of tradeoff that we try to model in the theory section below.    9
ability to co-opt the legislature, and the electorate's ability to compel the legislature to set 
the governor's salary appropriately, based on its preferences.  
Hence, we model gubernatorial wages as being determined by the following 
process: 
 
wit= φ  Rit + (1-φ ) Pit + η i + λ t + ε it 
 
where R denotes the wage obtained by the governor through his/her efforts lobbying the 
legislature (typically the Senate), while P denotes the wage chosen by the public; φ  is the 
weight of lobbying by the governor in the final wage, η i is an effect specific to the state, 
λ t  is a shock common to all states that may affect pay, and ε it  is an idiosyncratic shock. 
The main difference between the two parts of gubernatorial compensation is that the 
governor acts as Stackelberg leader on R while the public acts as leader on P.  
 
Rent-Extraction: The Politician as a Hunter 
The rents obtained by the governor are assumed to depend on the effort exerted by the 
governor in this endeavor and by the availability of funds to meet the governor's wage 
demands. We will refer to this as the ‘rent-seeking’ hypothesis. The setup is one where 
holding the office of governor gives one access to a pool of funds; the salary that the 
governor is able to extract depends on the effort he exerts in lobbying the legislature, and 
the level of funds available, just as a hunter's catch depends on the effort exerted in 
hunting and the amount of game in the area. So, the governor exerts effort to maximize 
R(e,s)-e where e is the governor's lobbying effort and s is the availability of funds. 
Assume that s=ty-x where t is the tax rate, y is taxable income and x is the level of 
expenditures. The wage is fully characterized by the following first order condition 
 
0 1= − e R  
where subscripts denote derivatives. It is reasonable to assume that there are decreasing 
returns to the governor's efforts and that the availability of funds makes lobbying efforts 
more productive. It is then direct to argue that the part of the wage determined by rent  
   10
extraction is positively related to income and the tax rate because 
 





























Position and Reward: The Public in Charge 
The second part of the governor's wage is determined by the public in its attempt to 
control and reward the governor (indirectly through the legislature). We divide this into 
two components. In the first, the public is not attempting to provide incentives, but would 
still like to keep the governor's wage in line with income in the state. This may be due to 
a desire to have the governor not suffer relative to the rest of society, or to continue to be 
able to attract the same pool of individuals into politics. If wages were not increased with 
income, the governor's wage would not keep its position in the distribution of state 
income. We refer to this as the ‘position’ hypothesis; it plays a similar role to a 
participation constraint in a standard principal agent model.  According to the position 
hypothesis, the public component of the governor’s wage, P, is simply indexed to state 
income, so that: 
 






The second component captures the idea that the public wants to reward good 
performance. Both a standard principal agent model and a simple "fair" compensation 
game give similar results. We focus on the latter as it is simpler and more closely follows 
the intuition outlined in the introduction. We refer to this as the ‘reward’ hypothesis. 
The public's objective is to give the governor a fair wage in order to compensate 
him for his effort (denoted E) in providing for the public's welfare. This target "fair" 
wage, P
*
, depends positively on the probability that the governor has exerted high effort, 
q. Gubernatorial effort affects performance; income is therefore given by yi(E, y-i, ε 1) 
where y-i is an observable shock to income and ε 1 is an unobservable shock. The tax rate   11
is given by ti(E, t-i, ε 2) where t-i is an observable shock to taxes and ε 2 is an unobservable 
shock. 
The problem of the public is now to set wages P, to minimize a loss function over 
the difference to the public’s fair wage, given by: 
 
()
2 * ) ( P q P MinP −  
such that  
 
() t t T y y Y q ˆ , ˆ − = − =  
where  y ˆ  and tˆ are the best predictors of income and taxation given all available 
information, and Y and T are the income and tax surprises respectively. The probability 
that the governor exerted effort above normal levels is positively correlated with positive 
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where the third expression in each line shows that changes in performance that are fully 





                                                 
8 Similar results obtain if a principal-agent model is used. In general, the principal will not want to make 
compensation depend on shocks that can be observed over which the agent does not have control. This 
would include noise (for which the risk averse agent must be compensated) and it does not improve the 
incentives for the agent.   12
In summary, the three separate competing models on pay-setting that we have 
outlined, have different empirical predictions. These predictions are summarized below, 
to emphasize the distinctions: 
 
Predicted Elasticities of Governor's Wage 
Low Democracy  High Democracy   
Rent-Seeking Position Reward 
Expected +  +  0 
Higher Income 
Unexpected +  +  + 
Expected +  0  0 
Higher Taxes 
Unexpected +  0  - 
 
We highlight, in particular, that the ‘reward’ hypothesis is the only one that 
predicts a negative relationship between higher taxes and gubernatorial wages.   
Furthermore, the ‘reward’ hypothesis distinguishes between expected and unexpected 
changes, while the others do not.  Finally, while both the rent-seeking and position 
hypotheses predict a positive relation between state income and gubernatorial wage, we 
note that increasing ‘democracy’, i.e., decreasing φ , will shift the emphasis towards pay 
dynamics governed by the public pay setting models (Position and Reward).  This will 
provide us with another opportunity to differentiate among the competing theories when 
shocks to income are expected: if the ‘position’ hypothesis dominates, then increased 
democracy should lead to an increased income elasticity of pay. By contrast, the 
‘rewards’ hypothesis predicts that greater democracy will bring the expected-income-
elasticity of pay towards zero. 
 
II. Empirical Strategy  
 
                                                 
9 The first paper to exploit this distinction is Hart (1983), who studies managerial contracts under different 
degrees of competition (see also Schmidt (1997)). Ades and Di Tella (1999) study a similar set of issues in 
a model that studies the relationship between competition and corruption.    13
Our empirical strategy proceeds in three stages. First we estimate the performance 
elasticity of governor's pay. We then evaluate whether this evidence favors our reward, 
position, or rent-seeking models. Lastly, we check whether democracy limits the amount 
of rent-extraction; this further allows us to differentiate among the various models.  
The basic regression takes the form: 
 
it t i it it it Controls Perform Wage ε λ η β α + + + + =  
 
where Wageit is the log of the governor's wage in year t and state i, Performit is a measure 
of performance such as the Log of Income per Capita or the Log of Tax Payments per 
Capita, Controlsit is a set of controls that include the governor's age and the state's total 
population, η  is a state fixed effect, λ  is a year fixed effect and ε  is an i.i.d. error term.. 
This coefficient can then be compared to those obtained in similar regressions in the 
literature on executive compensation, as well as comparable regressions that use 
bureaucratic wages as the dependent variable. 
Conditional on finding α≠ 0, we investigate whether this is evidence of rent-
seeking, the public keeping the governor’s relative income constant, a reward for 
performance through gubernatorial pay. A first, simple test is provided by examining 
regressions of the determinants of the state Health Commissioners’ pay. The strategy is to 
examine the pay of the member of the executive branch whose effort is least likely to 
affect our performance outcomes, income and taxation. Accordingly, a rewards model for 
this individual would predict that his/her pay should not be based on these factors. 
Our second approach is to investigate whether the governor's pay is correlated 
with the component of state per capita income that is beyond the control of the governor. 
The rewards model predicts that this element of income should be uncorrelated with 
compensation, while both the rent-seeking and position models predict a positive 
correlation. Recent empirical work in executive compensation has focused on this feature 
of principal agent models that parallel the one we describe in Section I (see, for example, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); see Wolfers (2002) for an application of the same 
techniques to gubernatorial elections). Since we are interested in a similar set of questions 
related to politician pay, we closely follow their approach. This consists of re-estimating   14
regression (1) with two-stage-least-squares techniques using the log of average personal 
income for the state’s geographic neighbors (Log of Neighbors’ Income). Since Log of 
Neighbors’ Income is observable, and presumably reflects a regional shock that cannot be 
attributed to the governor’s performance, it should not affect pay, under a rewards model. 
Including it would increase the risk faced by the politician (and hence average pay) and 
would not improve his/her incentives to provide effort. In other words, the hypothesis is 
that, once instrumented, this part of the state's income should not affect politician pay.
10  
Both rent extraction and position models predict a positive correlation. 
  An exactly analogous approach may be followed in looking at shifts in taxation 
that are beyond the control of the governor: we use tax payments of adjacent states (Log 
of Neighbors’ Taxes) as a summary statistic for regional shocks to demographics, 
economic circumstances, and region-specific policies that would impact the revenue-
raising requirements of a state.  As in the two-stage-least-squares regressions for income, 
if governor compensation is governed by the rewards model, once instrumented, tax 
levels should have no impact on pay. 
In the final section of the paper we test whether democracy, broadly conceived, 
limits the rent-extraction activities of politicians and intensifies the elements of public 
pay-setting.
11  First, we study the disciplining role of elections. Similar to Besley and 
Case (1995), we check for different behavioral responses of our basic model when 
governors can seek re-election and choose to do so, versus situations when they are 
unable or uninterested in running.  In particular, governors facing re-election may be less 
inclined to seek wage increases, lest it become an election issue. 
Second, we check if the income and tax sensitivity of gubernatorial pay is affected 
when the opposition party controls the state Senate. The idea is that the public makes pay 
decisions through its elected officials, and that opposition parties will be more effective 
                                                 
10 Another possible source of exogenous variation, utilized by Wolfers (2002), is the interaction of the price 
of oil with industry shares in each state (see Wolfers (2002) for a rationale of their use as instruments).  
Using this set of instruments yields even larger coefficients from state income than those reported in Table 
3(B).  Results available upon request. We thank Justin Wolfers for kindly providing us with the oil price 
and industry share data. 
11 There already exists a very substantial literature on the role of democratic institutions in shaping 
politicians’ behaviors, particularly in the area of fiscal performance.  In addition to the citations discussed 
in the main body of the text, some recent contributions include:  on the role of re-election incentives, 
Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) and Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998); on divided government, Poterba (1994) 
and Alt and Lowry (1994); and on voter referenda, Feld and Matsusaka (2001).   15
in their control functions than same-party officials. Since the state Senate is the final 
arbiter on matters of gubernatorial pay decisions, we focus on the role of this section of 
the legislature. Our reasoning here is precisely analogous to the idea of the co-opting of a 
board of directors by a CEO: if the board is filled with allies, there will be fewer 
constraints on the CEO’s ability to set his own wage (see, for example, Newman and 
Moses, 1999). 
Finally, we look at the effect of voter initiatives on the performance elasticity of 
pay. Our hypothesis is that in voter initiatives states, where policy is more directly shaped 
by voters, we should observe a greater weight on the public pay-setting components of 
our model.  This perspective on voter initiatives is outlined in Frey (1994), which 
describes the process by which voter initiatives facilitate the flow of information to the 
electorate, and prevent the formation of political coalitions to extract rents from the 
public.  Empirically, Frey and Stutzer (2000) presents evidence that suggests that the 
electorate is happier in Swiss cantons that allow for direct democracy.
12   
 
III. Basic Description of the Data and our Sources 
 
Our basic outcome variable, the level of pay of state governors, is taken from the Book of 
the States, a publication of the Council of State Governments.
13 Since this is only a 
biannual publication, our regressions are limited to observations from even years.  This 
publication has comprehensive coverage of the wages of senior elected officials and 
bureaucrats from each state, and was also the source of our wage data for the Health 
Commissioner for each state. To put these data into real terms, we deflated using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ consumer price index for urban consumers (1982 = 100). We 
                                                 
12 We also examined the effect of various aspects of gubernatorial decision-making power on governor’s 
pay sensitivity.  In particular, we examined the effect of line item veto power, control over the budget 
process, and appointment powers.  We did not find any consistent effect of these powers, and a composite 
measure of gubernatorial powers did not produce any significant effect.  This may be a reflection of the fact 
that the power vested in the governor’s office is more a function of personal factors, such as charisma, than 
official powers.  This is a point emphasized by Beyle (1999). 
13 Governors do receive other forms of compensation as well, such as the use of the governors’ mansion in 
most states.  We focus on salary since this is what is most readily observable and comparable across states, 
and we assume that it constitutes the bulk of gubernatorial compensation.  Analogous difficulties exist in 
looking at CEO compensation; see, for example, Hall (2000).   16
also collected data on the average wage of a bureaucrat in each state, taken from the 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S.
14 
We use two ‘performance’ measures.   The first is the log of state personal income 
per capita (again, in 1982 dollars), taken also from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Our 
second measure of performance is taxation, which we measure using the log of total state 
taxes per capita (income + sales + corporate).
15  Since these data are all available 
annually, we are able to use tax and income data from odd years, between the two pay 
observations, which should better reflect pay reactions to ‘performance’, rather than 
contemporaneous relationships.
16 
A number of covariates will also be important in the specifications below. In 
particular, a common finding from the CEO pay literature is that compensation is highly 
correlated with organizational size, presumably because of the greater skills required to 
manage a larger and more complex firm. A parallel argument also applies in the case of 
governors: the cross-sectional correlation between state population and governor’s wage 
is very high (equal to 0.63 for 1990).  Since population also tends to be correlated with 
income and wealth, it will be important to include state population as a control.
17 Life-
cycle considerations might also be important for the governor in seeking pay increases; 
hence, we also collected data on governors’ ages, taken from the Book of the States. To 
further probe the issue of whether compensation comes from rent-seeking or reward for 
performance, we also define a variable, In Power≥  2, that takes on a value of one in year 
y if the governor had been in office in year y-2, i.e., the previous observation in our 
biannual data set. 
Our section on the role of democracy in controlling the rent-seeking of politicians 
will require additional data on the political situation in each state. To examine the 
alignment of the governor with other politicians in the state, we define Opposition as a 
                                                 
14 Unless specified, all data below are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
15 Using log of taxes allows for a readier interpretation of the coefficient on the tax term.  Using tax rates, 
or detrended tax payments, yields similar results. Also, note that all of our results are somewhat stronger if 
corporate taxes are excluded; we include corporate taxes in order to be consistent with previous work. 
16 The results are similar, though slightly weaker, if we include contemporaneous values. When both 
contemporaneous and lagged values are included simultaneously, the lagged effects from both variables 
dominate. 
17 One could equally well argue that organizational size would be better reflected by the size of the 
government bureaucracy, as measured by expenditures or employees. Using these alternatives does not 
change any of the results reported below.   17
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the governor’s political party holds less 
than a majority (i.e., 50 percent) of seats in the state Senate.
18 A related hypothesis looks 
at the disciplining effect of elections; for this, we define the variable Upcoming Election, 
which takes on a value of one if there is an election before the next observation at t=y+2 
in which the current governor was able to run, and chose to do so. So, following Besley 
and Case (1995), we coded upcoming elections where the governor chose not to run, or 
was a lame duck, as zero. 
  Finally, to examine differences in pay sensitivity in states with and without voter 
initiatives, we define the dummy variable Voter Initiative, to take on a value of 1 if 
legislation could be made through voter referenda in that state-year (See Matsusaka 
(1995) for details).  Only 3 states approved voter initiative legislation between 1950 and 
1990, so there is very little within-state variation. 
  In order to maintain a consistent sample over time, and to be consistent with 
previous work, we limit our coverage to the 48 states that were already in existence in 
1950 (i.e., we exclude Alaska and Hawaii). In order to utilize the tax data of Besley and 
Case (1996), our series ends in 1990. Since, as mentioned above, we only have biannual 
observations for our wage data, we are limited to looking at even years.  
Before proceeding to our regressions, it will be instructive to examine the basic 
patterns present in our data, since so little quantitative work has looked at politician pay.  
Table 1 shows gubernatorial wages, by state, for 1950 and 1990, in 1982 dollars.  The 
median wage over this period shows an increase of only about 26 percent, from 48,090 to 
60,436, while real average bureaucratic wages increased by 112 percent over the same 
time period.
19  It is also striking to note that, while the average increased during 1950-90, 
the variance across states actually declined by almost half (from $21,108 to $12,850), 
indicating a very strong convergence of wages during the period. 
Figure 1A shows the median level of annual wages of our three types of 
government officials for each year during 1950-1990, in 1982 dollars. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there is considerable co-movement in the wages of the governor and the 
                                                 
18 This variable is not defined for Nebraska, and for some observations for Minnesota, because of the lack 
of a bicameral legislature. 
19 Other top state officials experienced pay increases that, while somewhat lower than the average 
bureaucratic rate of increase, were far higher than that of the governor.  For example, average treasurer 
wages increased by 64 percent, and average Health Commissioner wages increased by 68 percent.   18
Health Commissioner.
20 However, note that these results reflect only medians; as we will 
see below, there turn out to be important differences between the compensation of 
governors and other public officials. Furthermore, changes in wages are not as highly 
correlated: the correlation between changes in gubernatorial wages and changes in the 
wages of Health Commissioners is only about 0.15. Similarly, detrended wage data are 
only weakly correlated. It is also worth noting that there is much greater smoothness in 
average bureaucratic wages over time. This is not surprising, since it reflects a pooling of 
all individuals in state governments, and also might reflect less stickiness in wages. 
  There are surprisingly frequent changes in gubernatorial salaries, with nominal 
changes occurring in nearly half of the sample.  However, it is also interesting to observe 
that there are periods over which governors' wages decline in real terms: There are almost 
no nominal declines in wages (only 6 of any magnitude in our data, one of which is 
accounted for by the Massachusetts governor donating a third of his wage to charity), but 
there were many periods during which wages remained constant or increased at a rate 
lower than inflation.  This is illustrated in Figure 1B, which shows the median level of 
government officials' wages in nominal terms. 
We further investigate the timing of gubernatorial wage increases in Figures 2A-
D. In Figure 2A, which shows the average percent change in governors’ real wages over 
the preceding two years, it is apparent that wages in the latter part of the period under 
study increased, for the most part, every four years, thereby yielding the sawtooth pattern 
illustrated in this figure. The peaks in the figure coincide with years in which there had 
been recent gubernatorial elections in most states.  Thus, when the sample is split into 
governors approaching the ends of their terms, versus governors that were recently 
elected to office, the sawtooth pattern disappears (see Figures 2B and 2C). Moreover, 
when we look at the difference between these two groups, we find that wage increases are 
uniformly much higher for governors not facing imminent elections.  While these results 
are suggestive of certain political economy explanations described above, we will defer 
further interpretations to the results section below, where we may examine these patterns 
                                                 
20 More generally, we find that the wages of constitutional officers and senior bureaucrats in each state 
move together.   19
while appropriately controlling for other factors. Finally, we list the summary statistics 
for our data in Appendix B. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
IV.a. Basic Estimates of the Performance-Elasticity of Pay 
In this section we estimate the basic relationship between gubernatorial pay and two 
measures of performance. The first is the (log of) personal income per capita. Regression 
(1) in Table 2A, shows the simplest specification. The coefficient on income per capita is 
positive and comfortably significant. A ten percent increase in income per capita is 
associated with a 4.5 percent increase in the governor's wage. This is a large elasticity: to 
a first approximation it is almost twice as large as estimates obtained in the CEO 
compensation literature (see, for example Murphy (1999) and Table 4 in Hall and 
Liebman (1998)), in looking at the sensitivity of pay to share price.
21 Regression (2) 
includes the log of the governor's age and the log of population to control for the 
possibility that the governor's wage is adjusted for seniority and to control for the size of 
the state. This latter effect is analogous to the positive correlation between revenues and 
CEO compensation that is reported among both for profit and non-profit organizations.  
  As noted in the introduction, focusing solely on income as a performance measure 
may be clouded by alternative interpretations.  Regression (3) in Table 2A uses the Log 
of Taxes per Capita in the state as a measure of performance. The coefficient is negative 
and well defined. It shows that if the state's tax payments per capita increase by ten 
percent, the governor's wage falls by one percent. In contrast to the income sensitivity 
regressions, only the rewards model predicts this relationship.  Note that, while we might 
be concerned that per capita tax payments would be highly correlated with business 
cycles and state income, the coefficient on tax payments is largely unchanged by the 
                                                 
21 Note, however, that this elasticity is dependent on the time period chosen as pay elasticities have 
increased over the past few decades.  Also note that the dependent variable in Hall and Liebman (1998) is 
changes in wealth, which is analogous to levels in income.   20
inclusion/exclusion of income per capita (see regression (5)).  Hence, it appears that taxes 
exercise an effect on wages that is independent of income.
22 
  As a benchmark, Table 2B estimates similar regressions for average bureaucratic 
wages in the state. Regression (6) shows that the basic income elasticity of pay is about 
0.28, or a little more than half the gubernatorial pay elasticity.
23 Regression (7) shows 
that this holds after including the log of state population to control for size effects. More 
interesting are regressions (8) and (9) which show that the coefficient on state taxes has a 
positive and significant effect on average bureaucratic wages. Hence, in contrast to the 
results reported in the gubernatorial regressions, an increase in state taxes is associated 
with higher average bureaucratic wages.  This suggests that pay to top political officials 
is governed by a different set of dynamics than average bureaucratic wages.   
 
IV.b. Further Evidence using the Pay of Other Politicians and Observable Shocks 
Table 3A presents the results of regressions where the dependent variable is the log of the 
wage received by the Health Commissioner in the state. Regression (10) shows that there 
is also a large income elasticity of pay for these officials. Since the Health Commissioner 
is possibly one of the members of the executive branch that is least likely to receive 
incentive pay based on state income per capita, this result is in itself suggestive that at 
least some component of wage-setting is independent of performance. It could still be 
argued that politicians are part of teams and that the Health Commissioner is rewarded on 
state income, as is the rest of the team. Regression (11) shows that the Health 
Commissioner’s wage is insensitive to the proportion of the state's population that is over 
65 years of age, a variable that should be correlated with his workload.  Note that the 
Health Commissioner's wage is uncorrelated with per capita taxes, once again 
highlighting taxation as a potential means of evaluating and awarding governors for fiscal 
discipline (regressions (12) and (13)), and making the "team" interpretation suggested 
above less plausible. 
                                                 
22 As stressed by Wooldridge (2000), autocorrelation of errors can have different implications for the 
suitability of fixed-effects in levels approaches, as described above, versus first differencing.  He suggests 
that, unless one has strong priors regarding the choice of model, that both be utilized, to insure robustness.  
We report the log specification with fixed effects in order to be consistent with previous work on CEO 
compensation.  When we repeat our analyses using first differences, we obtain very similar results.  These 
are available from the authors upon request. 
23 But note that a standard deviation in bureaucrats’ wages is about 30 percent lower than that of governors.   21
  Table 3B studies the effect of observable changes in state income on gubernatorial 
pay. Reward models suggest that agents’ pay should not be affected by changes in 
performance that are due to observable factors (that are outside the agent's influence), as 
this simply introduces noise. Regression (14) shows the simplest two-stage least squares 
specification using the log of average per capita personal income of the state's 
geographical neighbors (i.e., all adjacent states) as an instrument for the element of 
income that is unaffected by gubernatorial actions.
24 The coefficient on Log of income 
per capita is positive, significant and marginally larger than the OLS estimate. This is 
further suggestive on non-incentive based pay.  The identifying assumption is that a 
state's per capita personal income is affected by regional shocks that can be observed by 
following the evolution of neighbors’ incomes. The first stage regression is 
 
Log of Inc per Capita  =  0.89      Log Neighbors’ Inc per Capita 




where Log Neighbors’ Inc per Capita denotes the log of average personal income per 
capita in the state’s geographical neighbors, and the regression includes both year and 
state fixed effects. 
  Regression (15) explores a potential weakness in our identifying assumption. It is 
possible that neighbor's income might affect a governor's pay by other channels, namely 
by providing some benchmark for relative performance evaluation. This argument 
suggests that neighbor's performance belongs directly in the gubernatorial pay equation. 
If this were the case, then after controlling for the state's performance, good performance 
of neighbors should have a negative impact on gubernatorial pay. The point estimate, 
however, is positive, though not statistically significant. 
We repeat the same exercise to further explore the structure of the tax elasticity of 
pay. Again the hypothesis is that there exist observable factors that are not influenced by 
any of the governor's actions that affect the state's level of taxation. An example could be 
an unexpected weather disruption in the region, such as a storm or a natural disaster. The 
                                                 
24 Note that we are not suggesting that, in our original wage regression, Perform is correlated with ε .  
Rather, we are instrumenting for state income to look at only the component of income that is independent 
of governors’ behaviors.   22
first stage regression, listed below, shows that there appear to be region-specific shocks 
to taxation, as a state’s level of taxation is highly correlated with that of its neighbors 
(this relationship is unaffected by the inclusion of neighbors’ income): 
 
Log of Taxes per Capita  =  0.25     Log Neighbors’ Taxes per Capita 




where Log Neighbors’ Taxes per Capita denotes the log of the average taxes per capita in 
the state’s geographical neighbors, and the regression includes both year and state fixed 
effects. 
In contrast to the results on per capita income, once instrumented, we do not find 
any effect of taxation on the governor’s income, as illustrated by the results in regression 
(16). Thus, the data suggest that governors may in fact be rewarded for fiscal 
responsibility rather than ‘lucky’ tax reductions. As in the instrumented income 
regression above, it may be argued that neighbors’ taxes are a useful benchmark for 
voters in judging the performance of their elected officials, and should therefore be 
included directly in the performance equation.  We examine this possibility in regression 
(17), and do not find any evidence that this is the case. 
Taken together, these results beg the question of why only one performance 
metric should be governed by reward for performance considerations. One explanation 
for choosing taxation rather than income as a performance measure is that taxes are more 
readily affected by the governor, and are also more easily tied to a governor’s actions.  
Since taxation is a parameter that is much more within the governor’s control than overall 
economic activity, this seems plausible. 
 
IV.c. The Role of Democratic Institutions 
Examining the role of democratic institutions provides an opportunity to further probe the 
validity of our results on rewards for tax cuts, and will allow us to further distinguish 
between the position and rent-seeking models that are both consistent with the positive 
correlation between state income and gubernatorial wages. Following the results 
summarized in the theory section, a decrease in the income elasticity would be consistent   23
with our rent-seeking model, while an increase in this elasticity would be supportive of 
the ‘position’ model. We may now investigate these possibilities by looking at the effect 
of three factors that might improve democratic accountability. 
 
Elections 
In an attempt to further examine the role of financial rewards in governors’ pay, we make 
the observation that an important tenet of reward for performance is that agents are 
rewarded for performance that is correlated with the actions they take, not the actions 
taken by their predecessors. So, if the income sensitivity of pay reflects reward for 
performance we expect the point estimate of Log of income per capita to be bigger for 
governors who have been in power for more than one year.
25 Thus we create a variable 
that takes the value 1 if the governor has been in power for at least 2 years (In Power≥ 2). 
The same is true for the tax elasticity of pay. If governors were punished for delivering 
tax increases, we would expect to see bigger effects for governors with longer tenure, as 
they are presumably responsible for those increases. In this context, identifying rent-
extraction motives versus rewards is feasible. While a positive interaction effect 
(Performance * In Power≥ 2) is consistent with both extraction and reward for 
performance when performance is measured using income per capita, a negative 
coefficient when taxes are used is evidence of reward-based pay. This is so because a 
governor could use his experience in office to entrench himself. With taxes as a measure 
of performance, a negative interaction shows that voters punish (reward) governors more 
who are more likely to have been responsible for such increases (reductions). An 
entrenched governor would be able to avoid pay cuts in such circumstances. Regressions 
(18), (19) in Table 4A show that tenure has little effect on the income elasticity of pay, 
but that it has a significant negative effect on the tax elasticity of pay. The coefficient on 
taxes increases by almost 100 percent when we are dealing with governors that have been 
in power for at least two years. Again, this is consistent with voters using rewards for 
performance when performance is defined as tax payments. 
                                                 
25 A key motivation for examining this issue comes from the observation that, shortly after Pete Wilson 
took over as governor of California, he received an 18 percent increase in wage as a result of legislative 
action that took place before he took office. Obviously, this wage increase could not be related to his 
performance as governor.   24
  Another approach, which follows Besley and Case, looks at the role of term limits 
and elections in constraining rent-seeking. Such a role for elections is suggested by the 
patterns illustrated in Figure 2; we examine this issue more carefully in regressions (20) 
and (21) of Table 4A. The level effect of facing re-election is significant and negative, 
i.e., governors are less inclined to push for wage increases immediately prior to an 
election. However, somewhat surprisingly, we do not observe any significant coefficients 
on the interaction of Upcoming Election with our measures of performance: that is, we do 
not observe re-election possibilities intensifying the effect of taxation, as a reward for 
performance, or attenuating the rent-extracting effects from economic growth. 
 
Separation of Powers 
We also look at the effect of political opposition on the sensitivity of reward-based pay.
26 
Our reasoning here is precisely analogous to the idea of the co-opting of a board of 
directors by a CEO: if the board is filled with allies, there will be fewer constraints on the 
CEO’s ability to set his own wage. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) develop this 
idea in the context of indirect democracy and show that conflict of interest between 
politicians in different branches of government may attenuate the rent extraction 
activities of politicians. The regressions in Table 4B evaluate the hypothesis that 
governors who face significant political opposition will have their pay respond more to 
performance. Here, we do find significant effects that may be interpreted as increased 
monitoring. The first of these regressions shows that the income elasticity of 
gubernatorial pay falls by about 0.14, or approximately 25 percent, when the governor’s 
party does not have a majority in the State Senate (Opposition).
27 The second regression 
looks at the effect of the opposition on the sensitivity of pay to taxation.  We find that the 
tax elasticity of the governor's wage is more than doubled when the governor’s party does 
                                                 
26 For a more general discussion of gubernatorial performance when there is divided partisan control of 
government, see Van Assendelft (1997). 
27 We report results using the definition of Opposition based on the presence of opposition in the Senate, as 
it is the final arbiter on matters of gubernatorial pay.  It also might be appropriate to account for the role of 
the Lower House in setting wages, but we then get into complications of aggregating the extent of 
opposition in the two Houses.  If we use a standard definition of gubernatorial opposition from the political 
science literature (Beyle, 1999), the evidence suggests an even stronger role of political opposition in 
promoting accountability.  For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between governors and  
legislatures across fifty states, see Rosenthal (1988).   25
not control the Senate.
28 Thus, we find the results on tax-setting to be consistent with the 
idea that controlled and monitored governors must perform well (i.e., lower taxes) in 
order to increase their own wages.  In contrast, the relationship between state income and 
gubernatorial compensation is attenuated by the existence of a solid opposition.  This is 
consistent with a rent-seeking view of the state income-wage relationship. Overall, it 
appears that political/democratic institutions may indeed serve an important role in 
imposing discipline on gubernatorial wage-setting. 
 
Direct Democracy 
Finally, in Table 4C, we look at the effect of voter initiatives on the performance 
elasticity of pay. Our hypothesis is that in voter initiatives states, where policy is more 
directly shaped by voters, we should observe a greater weight on the public component of 
our model, i.e., φ  is lower in voter initiative states.
29 In terms of taxation, the interaction 
of voter initiative and log of taxes per capita implies that the tax elasticity of pay is 
significantly (at the 1 percent level) larger in states that allow for voter initiatives. The 
size of the coefficient implies that the tax elasticity is nearly three times greater in voter 
initiative states, relative to those that do not allow voter initiatives. The results in (25) are 
consistent with reduced rent-extraction relative to rewards in voter initiative states: the 
interaction term on voter initiatives and log per capita income is –0.14 and significant at 
the 5 percent level, implying that the elasticity of pay with respect to income is about 30 
percent lower in voter initiative states relative to states without voter initiatives.  This is 
again in contrast to the ‘position’ model, which predicts an increased sensitivity of pay to 




An important tenet of modern political economy is that politicians are self-interested. 
Rather than maximize social welfare, it is claimed, they seek power, ego-rents and even 
bribes. Once this is recognized, a natural question arises concerning the possibility that 
                                                 
28 We observe even stronger effects when we set a lower threshold for Opposition of 40 percent. 
29 This hypothesis has a precedent in the work of Matsusaka (1992), who finds that direct legislation 
through voter initiatives is particularly common when representatives were unresponsive to the electorate.   26
pay may be used to motivate politicians through standard (monetary) incentive contracts. 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to study politician pay through the lens of the recent 
literature on executive compensation. We focus on the pay received by state governors in 
the United States, between 1950 and 1990. 
  Since, to our knowledge, there is no previous published work on the topic, our 
first task in the paper is to document the basic patterns in the data. This provides us with 
a useful starting point. We find that governors' wage data exhibits a substantial amount of 
variation, both across time and across states. It seems that the view that politicians are 
paid like bureaucrats can be rejected, at least if, by the latter, we mean that politician pay 
does not exhibit much variation. 
  We then investigate whether these variations can be matched with state 
performance indicators. We find that gubernatorial wages respond to changes in the level 
of income per capita in the state and also to levels of tax payments per capita, even after 
controlling for state and time fixed effects. The economic effects seem large: governors 
receive a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in 
their states and a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax 
payments. The income elasticity of pay is large, both in comparison to the basic elasticity 
of pay of bureaucratic wages in the state (about twice as large) and compared to the basic 
estimates in the CEO pay literature. 
We then investigate the forces shaping these elasticities. The income elasticity of 
gubernatorial pay could be explained by three alternative stories. The first is simply that 
voters attempt to keep governors at a constant position in the income distribution of the 
state. The second is a variant of a principal agent model where the public rewards the 
governor for good performance. The third is that the governor is simply extracting rents 
when the state has more resources available. The tax elasticity of pay, on the other hand, 
is inconsistent with the first and third views, and is suggestive of the second view when 
voters are seen as fiscal conservatives. 
As a preliminary step in investigating the alternative hypotheses concerning the 
income elasticity, we propose a simple illustrative test exploiting the fact that including 
observable noise into a contract reduces the payoff to the principal (as it introduces risk 
for which the agent must be compensated) and does not improve the governor's   27
incentives. Since the income elasticity is still large and significant after instrumenting 
income with observable shocks, it appears that this elasticity is not driven by reward for 
performance (it could be rent extraction or a desire to keep the governor on a constant 
position). In contrast, the tax elasticity is insignificant when it is instrumented with 
similarly observable shocks, consistent with the view that it is governed by a reward-
based pay model. 
  Finally, we report evidence implying that "democracy" plays an important role in 
shaping gubernatorial pay. The particular form this evidence takes suggests that the 
income elasticity is driven by rent extraction motives, and rejects the notion that a desire 
to keep the governor in a constant position in the distribution of income plays an 
important role. The evidence on the role of democratic institutions is again confirmatory 
of the hypothesis that the tax elasticity is driven by a rewards model. We find that having 
the state Senate dominated by the opposition party doubles the tax elasticity of 
gubernatorial pay and reduces the income elasticity of pay by about one third, a result 
that is consistent with the model of separation of powers and political accountability 
proposed by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997). Furthermore, states with ‘direct’ 
democracy, in the form of voter initiatives, have higher tax elasticities and lower income 
elasticities of gubernatorial pay than states that do not allow such initiatives.  
  Overall, these results are the following:  
1.  Gubernatorial pay is correlated with economic performance. The elasticities are 
large. 
2.  There is strong evidence that the tax elasticity reflects reward for performance 
motives. There is suggestive evidence that the income elasticity of pay is 
governed by rent extraction motives. 
3.  Democratic institutions play a quantitatively large role shaping gubernatorial pay. 
 
Collectively, the evidence suggests that examining the nature of politicians’ pay 
maybe an empirically fruitful approach to understanding the behavior of politicians. 
   28
   Figure 1: Median Wages of Government Officers and Bureaucrats, 1950-1990 
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Figure 2C: Average Biannual Salary Increases, Governors with
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Table 1: Governors’ Wages in 1950 and 1990 (1982 dollars) 
 
State 1950  1990     State 1950  1990 
Alabama 24,928  53,744 
 
Nebraska 41,547  44,390 
Arizona 41,547  57,400 
 
Nevada 31,576  54,229 
Arkansas 41,547  26,787 
 
New Hampshire  24,928  57,977 
California 103,867  65,054 
 
New Jersey  83,094  65,054 
Colorado 41,547  53,574 
 
New Mexico  41,547  68,880 
Connecticut 49,856  59,696 
 
New York  103,867  99,494 
Delaware 31,160  61,227 
 
North Carolina  62,320  94,136 
Florida 49,856  77,209 
 
North Dakota  24,928  49,897 
Georgia 49,856  68,017 
 
Ohio 54,011  49,747 
Idaho 31,160  42,093 
 
Oklahoma 27,005  53,574 
Illinois 49,856  71,380 
 
Oregon 41,547  59,314 
Indiana 33,237  59,079 
 
Pennsylvania 103,867  65,054 
Iowa 49,856  55,487 
 
Rhode Island  62,320  52,808 
Kansas 33,237  55,974 
 
South Carolina  31,160  64,975 
Kentucky 41,547  53,368 
 
South Dakota  35,315  46,547 
Louisiana 49,856  50,586 
 
Tennessee 49,856  65,054 
Maine 41,547  53,574 
 
Texas 49,856  71,507 
Maryland 16,619  65,054 
 
Utah 31,160  53,567 
Massachusetts 83,094  57,400 
 
Vermont 35,315  58,012 
Michigan 93,480  81,654 
 
Virginia 62,320  65,054 
Minnesota 49,856  79,488 
 
Washington 62,320  74,008 
Mississippi 41,547  57,859 
 
West Virginia  41,547  55,104 
Missouri 41,547  67,764 
 
Wisconsin 51,934  65,933 
Montana 31,160  39,578 
 
Wyoming 33,237  53,574 
    
 
Average 48,090  60,436 
    
 
Standard Deviation 21,108  12,850  
 
 
Table 2A: Gubernatorial Pay Regressions, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       




   0.527 
(0.114) 
       






       






       






       
       
       
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
No of Observations  960  960  960  960  960 
Adj. R
2  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2B: Bureaucratic Wage Regressions, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
      






      






      




      
      
      
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
No of Observations  960  960  960  960 
Adj. R
2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 3A: Health Commissioner’s Pay Regressions, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
      
Log Inc per Capita  0.527 
(0.115) 
   0.564 
(0.117) 
      




      




      
Log Population        -0.001 
(0.061) 
      
      
      
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
No of Observations  960  960  960  960 
Adj. R
2  0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Health Commissioner’s Wage. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  
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Instrument  Neighbors’ Income  Neighbors’ Taxes 
      





      
Neighbors Inc. per Capita    0.200 
(0.199) 
  
      




      
Neighbors Taxes per Capita        0.018 
(0.088) 
      
      
      
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
No of Observations  960  960  960  960 
Adj. R
2  0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses.    36
 
Table 4A: Accountability and the Electoral Cycle, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
  (18) (19) (20) (21) 
      





      




      










      





      




      
In Power ≥  2 * Log Inc  
                         per Capita 
-0.044 
(0.042) 
   
      
In Power ≥  2 *  Log Taxes 




      
Upcoming Election *  
Log Inc per Capita 
   -0.030 
(0.046) 
 
      
Upcoming Election *  
Log Taxes per Capita 
    -0.010 
(0.025) 
      
      
      
Year  Fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No  of  Observations  960 960 960 960 
Adj. R
2  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Both 
income and tax data are demeaned, to allow for the interpretation of coefficients on Upcoming 




Table 4B: The Role of the Opposition, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
 (22)  (23) 
    
Log Inc per Capita  0.442 
(0.121) 
 
    
Log of Taxes per Capita    -0.082 
(0.041) 
    











    
Opposition *  




    
Opposition *  
Log Taxes per Capita 
 -0.084 
(0.041) 
    
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
    
No of Observations  929  929 
Adj. R
2 0.93  0.93 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Both income and tax data are demeaned, to allow for the interpretation of 
coefficients on Upcoming Election and Opposition as the effect on an observation 
with an average level of income or taxes.   38
 
Table 4C: The Role of Voter Initiatives, 48 US States, 1950-90 
 
 (24)  (25) 
    
Log Inc per Capita  0.469 
(0.109) 
 
    
Log of Taxes per Capita    -0.058 
(0.041) 
    






    




    
Voter Initiative *  




    
Voter Initiative *  
Log Taxes per Capita 
 -0.094 
(0.027) 
    
    
    
Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
    
No of Observations  929  929 
Adj. R
2 0.93  0.93 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Log of Governor’s Wage. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Both income and tax data are demeaned, to allow for the interpretation of 
coefficients on Voter Initiative as the effect on an observation with an average level of 
income or taxes.  
Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
 
Log of Governor's Wage: The logarithm of the governor’s wage (benefits not included), 
in 1982 dollars.  Source: Book of the States 
 
Log Inc per Capita: The logarithm of state income per capita, in 1982 dollars. Source: 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 
 
Log Taxes per Capita: Log of total state taxes per capita. This includes income, sales, 
and corporate taxes.  Derived from Statistical Abstract of the United States 
 
Log Age: The logarithm of the governor’s age in the current year. Source: Book of the 
States 
 
Log Population: The logarithm of total state population. Source: Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
 
Log of Health Commissioner’s Wage: The logarithm of the Health Commissioner’s 
wage (benefits not included), in 1982 dollars.  Source: Book of the States 
 
Proportion Age>65: Percentage of the population that is greater than 65 years of age. 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
 
Log of Bureaucratic Wages: The logarithm of the average annual wage of state and local 
bureaucrats, in 1982 dollars. Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
 
Log of Neighbors Inc per Capita: Log of the average level of State income per capita of 
the states that are geographically adjacent. 
 
Log of Neighbors Taxes per Capita: Log of the average level of Taxes per Capita of the 
states that are geographically adjacent. 
 
In Power ≥ 2: Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if the governor was in power in the 
previous observed time period, i.e., two years prior. 
 
Opposition: Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if the governor’s party has below a 
certain threshold in the state Senate (cutoffs of 30, 40, and 50 percent). 
 
Upcoming Election: Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if there is an election within 
2 years, in which the governor was able to run, and chose to do so. 
 
Voter Initiative: Dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if policy may be set through 
direct voter initiative.   40
 




Dev. Min. Max Obs. 
       
 
Governor's  Wage  65,346 23,713 16,619 203,275  960 
 
Log of Governor's Wage  11.03  0.35  9.72  12.22  960 
 
Age of Governor  51.53  7.72  34  73  960 
 
State Income Per Capita  8,785  2,642  2,917  18,808  960 
 
Log(State Income Per Capita)  9.03  0.32  7.98  9.84  960 
 
State Population (1000’s)  4,131  4,281  163  28,100  960 
 
Log(State  Population)  14.76 1.01 12.00 17.15 960 
 






Log(State Taxes Per Capita)  5.94  0.55  4.25  7.05  960 
 
Health Commissioner's Wage  55,904  15,614  18,835  108,751  960 
 
Log(Health Commissioner's Wage)  10.89  0.30  9.84  11.60  960 
 
Average Bureaucrats' Wage  17,202  4,067  7,129  28,279  960 
 
Log(Avg Bureaucrats' Wage)  9.72  0.25  8.87  10.25  960 
 
Log of Neighbors’ Income per Capita  10.74  0.49  8.95  11.76  960 
 
Log of Neighbors’ Taxes per Capita  7.28 0.68 4.61 8.50 960 
 
Opposition 0.36  0.47  0  1  929 
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